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Attorney Loyalty and Client Perjury-A 
Postscript to Nix v. Whiteside 
Bennett L. Gershman * 
Most experienced prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys 
probably would agree that perjury in the criminal justice system oc- 
curs often. Although the frequency of perjury has never been demon- 
strated empirically, it is not surprising that with so much at stake, 
prosecution and defense witnesses would be tempted to fabricate testi- 
mony to meet the exigencies of the case. Detecting and dealing with 
perjurious testimony, however, is another matter. Implicated are com- 
plex legal and ethical problems for both prosecutors and defense attor- 
neys.' Moreover, the judiciary's response to these problems has been 
largely formalistic and deficient in enunciating sufficiently clear stan- 
dards to guide future behavior. 
For example, prosecutorial tolerance, and even subornation of 
perjury, usually is analyzed objectively for its impact on the 
factfinder's evaluation of the evidence, rather than focusing subjec- 
tively on the prosecutor's willfulness or bad faith.2 For purposes of 
remedying prosecutor misconduct in the future, such a response is 
wholly unsatisfactory. That issue, however, is a subject for another 
essay. The present discussion concerns the extent to which a criminal 
defense attorney legally and ethically may cooperate with his client in 
concealing the truth. 
Defense counsel's commitment to truth can vary greatly in the 
course of counsel's protecting the interests of his client. At one ex- 
treme are acts deliberately designed to conceal the truth, such as se- 
creting evidence, fabricating defenses, and suborning per j~ry .~  Such 
conduct can never be justified or condoned. At the other extreme are 
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1963, Princeton University; LL.B. 
1966, New York University. 
1. See J. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS--LAW AND LIABILITY (1986); B. 
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1985); G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW (1978). 
2. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
3. See, ag., Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
1474; In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp 
360 (E.D. Va. 1967), o r d ,  381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967); In re Branch, 449 P.2d 174, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 238 (1969); Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 
(1976); In re Rosenberg, 276 A.D. 268, 93 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1950). 
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options which legitimately permit suppression of the truth. These in- 
clude, for instance, advising a client to refuse to testify or comply with 
a subpoena ordering the production of records, pursuant to a valid 
claim of privilege." Between these ethical and legal extremes, how- 
ever, are more nebulous situations, such as "advising" a client of the 
legal consequences of possessing certain documents, or suggesting the 
availability of "hypothetical" defenses, knowing full well that the cli- 
ent will engage in conduct or tailor his story to mesh with that ad~ ice .~  
Given the adversary system, in which "winning" can overshadow the 
quest for truth,6 extremely complex questions arise: Is a criminal de- 
fense lawyer required to play the dual roles of "champion" of his cli- 
ent, and "gatekeeper" of the temple of justice? Are these roles really 
compatible? If so, what are the rules of the game? 
Consider in this connection perhaps the most difficult question of 
all: How much, if at all, can a criminal defense lawyer cooperate in his 
or her client's decision to commit perjury? Courts,7  commentator^,^ 
and bar committeesg have grappled with this question for years with- 
out offering clear or consistent guidelines. Any principled response 
must take into account some very hard questions. Under what cir- 
4. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 
(1892). 
5. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (West 1984) 
("In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not . . . counsel or assist his client in conduct 
that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
Rule 1.2(d) (West 1984) ("a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of 
conduct with a client and may assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, 
scope, meaning or  application of the lav;"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 
1.2(d) comment ("There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of 
questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime of fraud might be commit- 
ted with impunity."). 
6. See Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event of Quest for Truth? 1963 Wash. 
U.L.Q. 279. 
7. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986) (lawyer must withdraw or disclose intended 
pe jury); Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978) (withdrawal request predicated on 
alleged client perjury in middle of bench trial denied client fair trial); United States ex rel. Wil- 
cox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) (attorney's unnecessary disclosure to judge of cli- 
ent's intended pe jury has chilling effect on effective representation). 
8. Callan and David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclo- 
sure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976); Freedman, 
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 
MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Rieger, Client Perjlrry: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional 
and Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121 (1985). 
9. AM. TRIAL LAWYER'S ASS'N CODE Rule 1.2 (1980) (the ATLA Code contains no spe- 
cific rule on client pe jury since the entire matter is subsumed under Rule 1.2 relating to strict 
attonley confidentiality regarding client pe jury); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI- 
s lLr rY DR 7-102(A)(7) (West 1984); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2(d), 
3.3(~) (West 1984); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-7.7 (West 1984). 
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cumstances, for instance, does the lawyer ever really "know" that his 
client's proposed testimony is false? Is it sufficient if the lawyer simply 
disbelieves his client's story, or that of his client's witnesses?1° Does it 
make any difference if the attorney learns of a plan to perjure during 
the trial, as opposed to prior to the trial? What actions can the lawyer 
properly take when he believes that his client intends to commit per- 
jury? Is the prevention of pe jury more important than loyal and ag- 
gressive representation? Can the lawyer simply remain silent, and 
passively allow the perjury to occur? Can he threaten to impeach his 
client's testimony? Withdraw from the case? Report his client's ac- 
tions to the judge? 
Last Term, in Nix v. Whiteside, the Supreme Court for the first 
time addressed several of these questions. The Court unanimously 
agreed, under the facts of the case, that the lawyer's refusal to assist 
his client's plan to commit perjury did not deprive the defendant of his 
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, nor of his 
right to testify in his own defense.12 A majority of the Court essayed 
the ethical questions as well and, in obiter dicta, concluded that 
- 
"under no circumstances may a lawyer either advocate or passively 
tolerate a client's &ving false testimony."13 The majority went fur- 
10. A threshhold issue in dealing with client pe jury is the extent to which the lawyer must 
be convinced that his or her client intends to commit pejury. Model Rule 3.3(c), for example, 
advocates a standard of "reasonable belief" rather than actual knowledge that the client's testi- 
mony will be false. Many courts and commentators, however, have advocated a much more 
rigorous standard. See United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977) 
("mere unsubstantiated opinion" of attorney insufficient); People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 11 
(Colo. 1981) (mere inconsistency in client's story insufficient); ABA Comm. on Professional Eth- 
ics, Formal Op. 314 (1965) (lawyer should be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that client's 
testimony will be false); Rieger, Client Pejuly: A Proposed Resolution of the Constitutional and 
Ethical Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121, 149 (1985) (same as ABA Opinion). 
11. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986). 
12. Id. at 997. The Supreme Court has never explicitly held, but has consistently assumed, 
that a criminal defendant has a due process right to testify in his own behalf. Id. at 993; see 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,751 (1983) (In holding that an indigent defendant has no constitu- 
tional right to compel appointed counsel to pursue every nonfrivolous point on appeal, the Court 
noted that "the accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regard- 
ing the case, as to whether to . . . testify in his or her own behalf."); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 
U.S. 605, 612 (1972) (the Court, holding that a statute requiring a defendant to testify at the 
beginning of the defense's case, if defendant is going to testify at all, is unconstitutional, observed, 
"Whether the defendant is to testify is an important tactical decision as well as a matter of 
constitutional right."); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,225 (1971) ("Every criminal defendant 
is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so." However, the Court held that 
the privilege to testify does not give a defendant the right to commit pequry.). 
13. 106 S. Ct. at 996. The extent to which a lawyer may stand mute, and permit his client 
to testify in a free narrative fashion, is one of the most controversial issues relating to client 
pe jury. See infra note 24. 
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ther, however, and formulated specific rules of permissible and imper- 
missible attorney behavior. 
The facts were uncomplicated. Whiteside was tried in an Iowa 
state court for stabbing to death a friend, Love, following an argument 
over drugs. One of the principal issues was whether the killing was in 
self-defense. During pretrial preparation, Whiteside consistently told 
his court-appointed counsel that he had not actually seen a gun in the 
deceased's hand. About a week before trial, however, he changed his 
story, stating that he had seen "something metallic" in Love's hand, 
and that "If I don't say I saw a gun I'm dead." Whiteside's attorney 
warned him that if he so testified, he would advise the court of the 
defendant's proposed pe jury, seek to withdraw from the case, and at- 
tempt to impeach his client's testimony. Whiteside testified, stating 
that he "knew'y Love had a gun but had not actually seen a gun in 
Love's hand. After the jury returned a murder verdict, Whiteside 
moved for a new trial, contending that his lawyer's admonition not to 
state that he saw "something metallic" denied him a fair trial. Follow- 
ing a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and the Iowa Supreme 
Court alkned, holding that an attorney's duty to his client does not 
extend to assisting the commission of perjury.14 
Whiteside then petitioned the federal district court for a writ of 
habeas corpus, alleging that his counsel's actions denied him effective 
assistance of counsel and the right to present his defense. The district 
court denied the writ, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re- 
versed.15 The court found that although a criminal defendant's privi- 
lege to testifjr does not include a right to commit perjury, counsel's 
admonition that he would inform the court of the planned perjury 
constituted a threat to violate an attorney's duty to preserve client 
confidencesI6 and, as such, a breach of the standards of effective repre- 
sentation laid down in Strickland v. Washington. l7 
The Supreme Court reversed, and reinstated the conviction.18 
Every Justice agreed that Whiteside had not been denied effective rep- 
resentation under the Strickland test, which requires a defendant to 
show that counsel committed such serious professional errors as to 
14. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1978), rev'd sub nom. Whiteside v. 
Scum, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986). 
15. Whiteside v. Scum, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'dsub nom Nix v. Whiteside, 106 
S. Ct. 988 (1986). 
16. Id. at 1330. 
17. 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
18. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986). 
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undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.lg An attorney's 
duty to his client, agreed the five-Justice majority, is limited to legiti- 
mate conduct and does not include assisting his client in presenting 
false evidence.20 
Although not required to, the majority discussed what it believed 
were appropriate ethical responses for lawyers faced with client per- 
jury. The attorney should attempt initially to dissuade his client from 
his u n l a h l  ~ l a n . 2 ~  If that course is unsuccessful, the attorney is obli- 
gated to reveal his client's conduct to the and even to seek to 
withdraw from the ~ase .2~  The majority emphasized that under no 
19. 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694. The Court in Strickland emphasized that a claim of ineffec- 
tiveness has two components. First, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
"deficient" in that he "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Second, the defendant must 
show that he was prejudiced, in that "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687. 
20. 106 S. Ct. at 994. 
21. "It is universally agreed that at a minimum the attorney's first duty when confronted 
with a proposal for pe rjurious testimony is to attempt to dissuade the client from the unlawful 
course of conduct." 106 S. Ct. at 996. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil- 
ity, Informal Op. 1314 (1975); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment 
@Vest 1984). 
22. The Court stated: "Indeed, both the Model Code and the Model Rules do not merely 
authorize disclosure by counsel of client pe rjury; they require such disclosure." 106 S. Ct. at 995 
(emphasis in original). This is not altogether correct. The Model Rules appear to require disclo- 
sure only after the client has given false testimony. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON- 
D U C ~  Rule 3.3 comment (West 1984). Moreover, the Model Code appears to allow, but does not 
require, an attorney to reveal his client's intention to commit perjury. See MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (West 1984). Nor is the Court's reliance on 
DR 7-102@)(1) correct, since that provision concerns a lawyer's obligation when faced with a 
client who has already committed pe rjury. The courts are equally unclear. Compare State v. 
Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970) (announced intention by defendant to commit 
perjury is not within the confidences an attorney is bound to respect) and People v. Salquerro, 
107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980) (same) and State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 
S.E.2d 174 (1976) (same) with United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 
1977) (attorney may not volunteer a mere unsubstantiated opinion that his client's protestations 
of innocence are perjured) and Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d 844 @.C. 1980) (unnecessary 
to betray confidences of client). Moreover, disclosure may impinge on the attorney-client confi- 
dential relationship, see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI~ DR 4-101 (West 
1984), as well as the defendant's right to a fair trial. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 
F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977). 
23. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1975); 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (West 1984). Several courts 
require the attorney to withdraw upon learning of a client's intention to commit perjury. See 
Newcomb v. State, 651 P.2d 1176 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); People v. Blye, 223 Cal App. 2d 143, 
43 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1965); In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 252 S.E.2d 784 (1979). A withdrawl 
motion probably will be denied if counsel refuses to disclose to the court the basis for the motion. 
See United States v. Henkel, 799 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1327 (1987); 
People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981); People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 
N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980). See also Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the 
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circumstances should the lawyer assist his client in giving, or even pas- 
sively permit his client to give, false testimony.24 Moreover, counsel's 
threats to reveal Whiteside's perjury and to withdraw from the case 
were indistinguishable, according to the majority, from disclosing cli- 
ent misconduct such as tampering with witnesses or jurors.2s "In 
short, the responsibility of an ethical lawyer, as an officer of the court 
and a key component of a system of justice, dedicated to a search for 
truth, is essentially the same whether the client announces an intention 
to bribe or threaten witnesses or jurors or to commit or procure per- 
jury. No system of justice worthy of the name can tolerate a lesser 
standard."26 
Four Justices concurred in the result, but would have limited 
their consideration to the constitutional questions involved. These 
Justices resisted the invitation to enter this "thorny" and "controver- 
sial" area and to formulate rigid rules of professional conduct for at- 
torneys. Since Whiteside had no constitutional right to his counsel's 
assistance in committing perjury, nor to counsel's silence about the 
plan, no violation under the Strickland test had occurred. That is not 
to say, emphasized the concurring Justices, that a sixth amendment 
violation could not be shown in other related circumstances. This 
showing might depend on the level of the attorney's certainty about 
the proposed pe jury, the stage of the proceedings at which the attor- 
ney discovers the plan, or the methods used by the attorney to try to 
dissuade his client. The concurring Justices cautioned, however, that 
attorneys who adopt "the role of the judge or jury to determine the 
facts pose a danger of depriving their clients of the zealous and loyal 
advocacy required by the Sixth A~nendment."~~ 
Defense Lawyer's Conjicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75 
(1981). 
24. Prior to Whiteside, the approach most widely accepted by the courts was the free narra- 
tive, whereby an attorney who believed that his client would testify falsely would first inform the 
court that he advised his client not to testify, and then remain mute while the defendant gave his 
testimony, without conducting any examination or arguing the testimony to the jury. See STAN- 
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-7.7 (West 1984); Burger, Standards of Conducts: A Judge's 
Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 13 (1966). See also United States v. Campbell, 616 F.2d 1151 
(9th Cir. 1980); Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978); Butler v. United States, 414 
A.2d 844 @.C. 1980); Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309 @a. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. 
Fosnight, 235 Kan. 52, 679 P.2d 174 (1984); People v. Salquerro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 
N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980); In re Goodwin, 279 S.C. 274, 305 S.E.2d 578 (1983). 
25. Preventing a client from tampering with witnesses or jurors arguably stands on an en- 
tirely different footing than threatening to expose a client's own false testimony. Testimony by a 
defendant is inextricably connected with constitutional considerations; no such considerations 
apply to the corruption of witnesses or jurors. 
26. 106 S. Ct. at 998. 
27. Id. at 1006 (citation omitted). 
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Nix is a troubling decision. As a jurisprudential matter, the case 
is a peculiar blend of constitutional doctrine and legal morals. The 
holding is fairly narrow; the dicta is extremely broad. Essentially the 
Court emphasized, as it has on many previous occasions, that perjury 
is obnoxious to the justice system?* and announced for the first time 
that a lawyer's refusal to cooperate in his client's plan to lie does not 
render the lawyer ineffective under the sixth amendment. This result 
was predictable. Wholly unpredictable, however, was the Court's will- 
ingness to enter the ethical twilight zone of attorney-client interaction 
and to promulgate a code of attorney behavior in the context of client 
perjury. 
Several points are notable. First, this excursion into defense law- 
yer ethics stands in sharp contrast to the Court's historic unwilling- 
ness to impose ethical rules for prosecutors or other government 
officials. The Court recently wrote: "Nothing in the Constitution 
vests in us the authority to mandate a code of behavior for state offi- 
c i a l ~ . " ~ ~  Similarly, the Court observed: "The Due Process Clause is 
not a code of ethics for  prosecutor^."^^ And in one recent case in 
which a prosecutor engaged in outrageous misc~nduct ,~~ the Court, 
after issuing a few paragraphs of mild reproach, concluded: ''Defend- 
ant's] trial was not perfect-few ar+but neither was it fundamentally 
unfair."32 It became the function of the four dissenting Justices to 
outline, painfully, the numerous ethical rules which the prosecutor vi- 
olated. Ironically, in cases involving prosecutorial subornation of per- 
jury and suppression of evidence, the Court has carefully avoided 
ethical condemnations, stating: "Nor do we believe the constitutional 
obligation is measured by the moral culpability, or willfulness, of the 
prose~utor."~~ Unevenhanded ethical jurisprudence promotes cyni- 
cism and disrespect, and can even encourage further government mis- 
conduct.34 Aggravating the concerns over such disparate treatment, 
of course, is the overriding legal and ethical precept that it is the obli- 
gation of the prosecutor, rather than that of defense counsel, "not that 
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."35 
28. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969); 
Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969); United States v. Noms, 300 U.S. 564 (1937). 
29. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135. 1143 (1986). 
30. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 511 (1984). 
31. Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986). 
32. Id. at 2473 (citation omitted). 
33. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976). 
34. See Gershman, Why Prosecutors Misbehave, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 131 (1986). 
35. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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Moreover, Nix v. Whiteside, as with other decisions involving the 
role of counsel for indigent defendants, continues a trend which 
threatens to undermine the fierce and dedicated representation to 
which such defendants are constitutionally entitled. Just as it is virtu- 
ally inconceivable that a privately retained lawyer would ever file an 
"Anders brief" alleging no meritorious issue,36 it is equally inconceiv- 
able that a privately retained lawyer would threaten to impeach his 
client's proposed testimony, or report his conduct to the judge, It is 
hardly surprising that virtually all of the decisions dealing with client 
perjury involve attorneys who are either public defenders, or court ap- 
pointed. This is not to suggest that a poor defendant has any greater 
right to commit perjury than does a wealthy one, or that retained law- 
yers necessarily would tolerate client perjury more readily than law- 
yers paid by the state Nor it is altogether clear that public 
defenders view the issue of client perjury differently than do retained 
counsel. However, any attorney who feels that he has to justify to the 
court the correctness or effectiveness of his representation, or who is 
inclined to play the role of jury or judge, may, as the concurring opin- 
ion in Nix warned, deprive his clients of the zealous advocacy guaran- 
teed by the Constitution. 
Finally, to the extent that Nix authorizes defense counsel to en- 
gage in conduct which effectively drives his client off the witness 
stand, it constitutes an insensitive and unwarranted intrusion into a 
defendant's right to testify in his own behalf.38 Crucial to notions of 
civilized justice are concerns for a defendant's individual freedom and 
dignity. Such concerns ought to be respected, even at the risk of false 
Surely the abolition of common law rules of witness dis- 
qualification did not imply that defendants thereafter would give only 
truthful testimony. Thus, shocking as it may seem to some, a defend- 
ant probably should be allowed to lie, even though he has no right to 
lie. The jury, not defense counsel, should be the safeguard against per- 
jury. As Justices Brennan and Marshall observed: "The role of the 
defense lawyer should be above all to function as the instrument and 
36. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) 
(indigent defendant has no constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to argue on appeal 
all nonfrivolous points). 
37. To be sure, privately retained counsel may raise the issue from a sincere belief in the 
ethical considerations. On the other hand, such counsel may raise the issue for tactical reasons, 
such as in seeking a continuance or engineering a mistrial. See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 
F.2d 727,731 n.6 (9th Cir. 1978); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754, 761 (5th Cir. 1967), 
af'd after remand, 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968). 
38. See supra note 12. 
39. G. HAZARD, supra note 1 ,  at 127-35. 
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defender of the client's autonomy and dignity in all phases of the crim- 
inal pro~ess."~' To be sure, a lawyer should not cooperate in his cli- 
ent's perjury, assist him in any manner, or use such testimony in 
argument to the jury. Such conduct, however, is a far cry from the 
conduct of the lawyer in Nix. He was functioning not as a defense 
counsel, but as a surrogate prosecutor. Simultaneous commitments to 
one's client and to the cause of abstract justice are incompatible. To 
the extent that bar codes and court decisions mandate such behavior, 
they demand from attorneys the impossible. If the defendant wishes 
to lie, the lawyer should sit back and let his client say what he wants to 
say?l From a tactical standpoint, this may be the worst possible sce- 
nario for a defendant. But, that is his ch0ice.4~ Nothing in Nix v. 
Whiteside prevents state bar associations from enacting ethical rules 
consistent with this approach.43 
40. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (1983). 
41. Admittedly, this approach is less extreme than the "full representation" approach pro- 
posed by Professor Freedman. See Freedman, Prof&onal Responsibility of the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). Under the "full represen- 
tation" approach, which some courts have sanctioned, the attorney argues to the court and jury 
that which he knows to be false. See Coleman v. State, 621 P.2d 869, 877-878 (Alaska 1980); 
People v. Blye, 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235 (1965). 
42. Arguably, a lawyer standing mute and refraining from direct or redirect examination, 
and then failing to support the defendant's testimony in closing argument, conveys to the jury a 
pretty clear signal as to defense counsel's view of the evidence. 
43. The Court stated: 
\men examining attorney w.nduct, a court must be careful not to narrow the wide 
range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitu- 
tionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the 
State's proper authority to define and apply the standards of professional conduct appli- 
cable to those it admits to practice in its courts. 
106 S. Ct. at 994. Justice Brennan similarly observed: "mhe Court cannot tell the states or the 
lawyers in the states how to behave in their courts, unless and until federal rights are violated." 
Id. at 1000 (wncumng opinion) (emphasis in original). 
Thus far, twenty-one states have adopted rules substantially based on the ABA Model 
Rules; New York continues to follow the ABA Model Code. See 3 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct 
(ABADNA) 93 (April 1, 1987); 3 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABADNA) 190 (June 24, 
1987). 
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